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A widely spread belief among economists is that monetary policy has relatively short-lived 
effects on real variables such as unemployment. Previous studies indicate that monetary 
policy affects the output gap only at business cycle frequencies, but the effects on 
unemployment may well be more persistent in countries with highly regulated labor markets. 
We study the Swedish experience of unemployment and monetary policy. Using a structural 
VAR we find that around 30 percent of the fluctuations in unemployment are caused by 
shocks to monetary policy. The effects are also quite persistent. In the preferred model, 
almost 30 percent of the maximum effect of a shock still remains after ten years. 
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1. Introduction 
The effects of monetary policy shocks on the output gap are relatively well documented. The 
response of the output gap is hump shaped with the peak occurring between four and six 
quarters after a shock. By the definition of the output gap, the effect then disappears within the 
business cycle. Given Okun's law, movements in output can be directly translated into 
movements in unemployment. The actual reaction of unemployment to monetary policy shocks 
is however poorly documented and it is not clear whether it really is a mapping of the effects on 
the output gap. In particular, while U.S. unemployment can reasonably be characterized as a 
mapping of the output gap, this is arguably not true of unemployment in most European 
countries. 
 
In this paper we analyze the effects of monetary policy on unemployment in Sweden. 
Specifically we investigate how much of the fluctuations in unemployment that are caused by 
monetary policy shocks and how persistent these effects are. Answers to these two questions 
are obtained from a structural VAR model. Variance decompositions show which shocks that 
have caused movements in a variable during the sample period and impulse response functions 
contain information about the magnitude and duration of the effects of a specific structural 
shock. 
 
Although the effects of monetary policy on unemployment are not as well documented as one 
might imagine, there is a handful of previous studies of the issues at hand. Ravn and Simonelli 
(2006) estimate a twelve-variable VAR on U. S. data and study the effects of four structural 
shocks, including monetary policy, on several labor market indicators. They find that (i) the 
response of labor market variables to monetary policy shocks is hump shaped, (ii) between 15 
and 20 percent of the variance in unemployment is caused by monetary policy shocks, and (iii) 
the maximum effect of a shock occurs after 4-5 quarters. 
 
The sources of movements in unemployment have been studied using variance decompositions 
in several papers, including Dolado and Jimeno (1997), Jacobsson et al (1997), and Carstensen 
and Hansen (2000). Dolado and Jimeno analyze Spanish unemployment and conclude that the 
main source of unemployment variability is productivity shocks (37 percent), while labor   2
supply shocks and demand shocks account for 25 percent each. Carstensen and Hansen (2000) 
find that technology shocks and labor supply shocks account for most long-run fluctuations in 
German unemployment but that goods market shocks are important in the short run. Similar 
results are found for Italy by Fabiani et al. (2001). Jacobson et al (1997) find that transitory 
labor demand shocks have negligible effects on unemployment in the Scandinavian countries.
1 
Maidorn (2003) on the other hand find that demand shocks account for 40 percent of the ten-
year fluctuations in Australian unemployment and Gambetti and Pistoresi (2001) find 
permanent effects of demand shocks on Italian unemployment that account for almost 60 
percent of the ten-year fluctuations. These papers do not identify shocks to monetary policy 
separately but the total results for demand shocks can be interpreted as an upper bound for the 
influence of monetary policy. Karanassou et al. (2005) and Christoffel and Linzert (2005) 
among others document persistent effects on European unemployment rates using other 
approaches than VAR models. Jacobson et al. (2003) actually document permanent effects of 
monetary policy on Swedish unemployment, but they model the rate of unemployment as an  
I(1) process whereby all shocks automatically have permanent effects. Algan (2002) finds that 
the standard model works well for the U.S. but fails to capture the rise of French 
unemployment. Amisano and Serati (2003) conclude that demand shocks have persistent 
effects on unemployment rates in several European countries. In their SVAR, the effect of a 
demand shock dies out in 13-17 quarters in the investigated European countries, compared to 7 
quarters in the U.S.  
 
This paper differs from previous studies in several respects. First, the demand side of the 
economy is modeled in a more elaborate fashion. We allow for three different kinds of demand 
shocks, viz. monetary policy, fiscal policy, and foreign demand. The finding in previous work 
that demand shocks are unimportant to unemployment fluctuations may well be a consequence 
of the rudimentary modeling of the demand side of the economy. Our results indicate that 
around 30 percent of the fluctuations in unemployment are caused by shocks to monetary 
policy. The effects are also quite persistent. In the preferred model, more than 30 percent of the 
maximum effect of a shock still remains after ten years. 
 
                                                 
1 Their data series end in 1990 and thus exclude Sweden’s turbulent experiences during the 1990s.   3
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 gives an account of the Swedish unemployment 
experience and macroeconomic policies over the last couple of decades. Section 3 discusses 
model specifications, section 4 describes the data and section 5 presents the main results. 
Section 6 includes extensive robustness checks and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Unemployment and Macroeconomic Policies in Sweden
2 
2.1 Stabilization Policy in Turmoil  
For most of the 20
th century, Sweden pursued a fixed exchange rate policy. After the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the Swedish krona was first pegged to the D-mark (via the 
“currency snake”) and from 1977 to 1991 to a trade-weighted basket of foreign currencies. A 
crucial requirement for the feasibility of the fixed-exchange regime was, of course, that domestic 
inflation was kept in line with inflation abroad. This turned out to become increasingly difficult 
and a series of devaluations took place in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. These devaluations 
resulted in substantial (albeit temporary) improvements in competitiveness that counteracted the 
adverse employment effects of unsustainable inflation. The large devaluations in the early 1980s 
paved the way for an employment expansion that lasted throughout the decade, reinforced by an 
international upswing as well as expansionary domestic policies. However, the expansionary 
domestic policies during the 1980s carried the seeds that ultimately led to a complete regime shift 
in stabilization policy in the early 1990s. 
 
The credit market was one important source of domestic demand expansion. By the end of 1985, 
Swedish financial markets had been largely deregulated. Restrictions on household loans in 
commercial banks and credit institutions had been lifted, which set in motion a rapid increase in 
bank loans to the household sector. This change took place during a period when marginal tax 
rates were generally high and when mortgage payments were deductible in income taxation. The 
interaction of financial deregulation, progressive taxes and generous rules for deducting interest 
payments created the preconditions for a strong credit expansion. The total credit volume 
increased at an annual rate of almost 20 percent during 1985-1990. The consumption boom that 
followed involved a fall in the household saving rate to minus 5 percent of disposable income in 
1988 and a gradual build-up of household debt.  
                                                 
2 This section draws heavily on Holmlund (2003).   4
 
The surge in aggregate demand contributed to a fall in unemployment along with a gradual 
increase in inflation. By the end of the 1980s, unemployment was approaching 1 percent of the 
labor force. Monetary policy was tied to defending the fixed exchange rate and fiscal policy was 
too lax to prevent the rise in inflationary pressure. 
 
During the late 1980s, a government committee developed a far-reaching proposal for reform of 
the Swedish tax system. Key elements were lower marginal tax rates on labor earnings and the 
introduction of a dual system of income taxation with a 30 percent tax rate on income from 
capital. Mortgage payments could then be deducted at 30 percent. These reforms were put into 
practice in 1990 and 1991 and caused a marked increase in after-tax real interest rates. The 
demand for owner-occupied housing fell predictably; between 1990 and 1993, the fall in real 
prices amounted to 30 percent. On top of this, the household saving rate rose from minus 5 
percent in 1988 to plus 7 percent in 1992. The rise in saving reflected households’ attempts to 
bring down a debt-to-income ratio that had shown a marked increase over the 1980s, especially 
during the second half of the decade.  
 
In this environment, Swedish stabilization policy took close to a U-turn. The prime objective for 
decades had been full employment, although the desirability of low inflation was recognized in 
words. In practice, this has led governments to undertake several devaluations in the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s so as to restore competitiveness that had been eroded by high inflation and 
fixed exchange rates. In the early 1990s, the government declared that low inflation was the 
prime objective of stabilization policy. A unilateral affiliation of the krona to the ECU was 
declared in May 1991. The stated intention was to rule out future devaluations as escape routes 
from unsustainable inflation and loss of competitiveness.  
 
In addition to self-inflicted wounds, Swedish policy making was also hit by bad luck in the early 
1990s. An international recession struck during the first years of the decade. Industrial production 
declined between 1990 and 1993 by 4-5 percent in the EU area and by over 6 percent in 
Germany. The general weakening of major Swedish export markets added to the falling demand 
for Swedish exports and reinforced the sharp decline in GDP.    5
 
During the fall of 1992, the krona was put under a number of speculative attacks and it became 
increasingly doubtful whether the fixed exchange rate was sustainable. The real exchange rate 
was overvalued with between 10 and 20 percent, creating severe difficulties for the export sector. 
In order to defend the fixed exchange rate, the central bank kept a high short-term interest rate 
throughout 1992 and raised it to 500 percent in September. Given inflation rates around two 
percent, also the real interest rate was extremely high during this period. In November 1992, the 
fixed exchange regime had to be abandoned and the krona was floating. A new monetary regime 
was established, including an inflationary target (from early 1993) and a more independent 
central bank (from the late 1990s).  
 
The chronological tale told so far emphasizes two main policy failures. First, it is clear that fiscal 
policy was too lax in the second half of the 1980s. The fixed exchange rate target had tied the 
hands of monetary policy and only fiscal policy tools were available to combat rising inflationary 
pressure. Second, it is also clear that the timing of financial deregulation and tax reform was less 
than optimal. Under more ideal circumstances, the tax reform should have preceded financial 
liberalization, rather than the other way around. Had the financial liberalization taken place in an 
environment with less favorable conditions for household loans, the effects on credit demand and 
private consumption would have been smaller.  
 
These claims appear fairly uncontroversial, although the fine details of the impact of financial 
deregulation and tax reform are debatable. More controversial is an assessment of the policy 
stance vis-à-vis the emerging slump in the early 1990s. A less stubborn defense of the krona 
would presumably had cushioned the downturn and led to a less dramatic rise in unemployment.  
 
2.2 The Evolution of Unemployment and Nonemployment 
The Swedish unemployment rate displayed modest fluctuations around an average level of 2 
percent during the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s.
3 A weak trend increase in unemployment 
                                                 
3 These are unemployment figures from the Swedish labor force surveys. The Swedish definition of unemployment 
differs slightly from unemployment as defined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). In particular, 
students engaged in fulltime job search are classified as unemployed by ILO but as out of the labor force in the 
national definition. We will discuss alternative unemployment measures as we proceed.    6
could be identified, however. The recession of the early 1970s entailed higher unemployment 
than what was observed during the 1960s. Likewise, the early 1980s witnessed a recession 
where unemployment approached 4 percent, a level considered as exceptionally high by the 
standards of the 1960s and the 1970s. However, by the end of the 1980s the unemployment rate 
had reached a decade low of 1.1 percent (June 1989). 
 
The three decades from the early 1960s to the late 1980s also involved sharply rising female 
participation rates. In 1965, female participation in the labor force stood at 54 percent; in 1989 
it had risen to 82 percent. Male participation rates fell only modestly – from 89 to 86 percent 
between 1965 and 1989 – and the aggregate labor force participation rate thus rose 
dramatically. Employment increased in tandem with the increase in participation. By the late 
1980s, employment-to-population rates stood at 85 and 81 percent for males and females, 
respectively.  
 
The slump of the early 1990s involved a fall in the level of GDP from peak to trough by 6 
percent and produced an unprecedented increase in unemployment. Between 1990 and 1993, 
unemployment rose from 1.5 percent to 8.2 percent. The increase in unemployment was 
accompanied by a sharp decline in labor force participation among both men and women. The 
total decline in employment in the early 1990s amounted to around 500 000 persons, or a fall in 
the employment-to-population rate from 83 percent to 73 percent between 1990 and 1993.  
 
Over the period 1993 to 1997, the unemployment rate hovered around 8 percent whereas 
employment fell slightly (reaching 70.7 percent of population in 1997). However, a strong 
rebound began in 1997 and involved a rise in GDP growth and employment as well as a 
substantial fall in unemployment. By 2001 the unemployment rate had fallen to 4 percent and 
the employment-to-population rate had increased to 75 percent.  
 
The evolution of unemployment according to several measures is displayed in Figure 1. The 
gap between “ILO unemployment” and the national measure consists of full-time students 
searching for a job. The ILO rate hit 10 percent in 1996 and 1997 and had fallen to 5 percent in 
2001. An extended measure of unemployment includes also those “latent job seekers” who are   7
jobless, willing and able to work but do not meet the search criteria for being classified as 
unemployed.
4 This extended unemployment rate hit 12-13 percent in the mid-1990s and had 
fallen below 7 percent by 2001. 
 
Rising unemployment is clearly only one part of the increase in nonemployment, the other 
being rising nonparticipation. Figure 2 shows how a very broad measure of unemployment – 
nonemployment – has evolved over time; nonemployment is simply one minus the 
employment-to-population rate. The 1970s and the 1980s exhibited a trend decline in 
nonemployment which largely reflected rising female labor force participation. This trend was 
sharply broken when the slump of the early 1990s hit the Swedish economy. The increase in 
nonemployment has turned out to be largely persistent. However, part of the increase in 
nonemployment is driven by enhanced educational opportunities provided by government 
policies, including an expansion of higher education and initiatives to foster adult education. 
 
A significant fraction of nonparticipation involves “inactivity” associated with early retirement, 
receipt of disability pensions and long-term sickness. Information on these categories is not 
available on a consistent basis in the labor force surveys. There is nevertheless strong evidence, 
from the labor force surveys and other sources, that nonparticipation for various disability and 
sickness-related reasons has increased over the 1990s.  
 
2.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy after the Slump 
When the krona was left to float in November 1992, it depreciated immediately and by the end 
of 1992 it had fallen by 15 percent against the ECU. Competitiveness was restored to a level 
comparable to the situation after the devaluation in 1982. The improved competitiveness as 
well as stronger market growth brought about a rise in exports. Between 1993 and 1995, 
manufacturing output increased by over 20 percent and manufacturing employment by around 
15 percent. Despite this marked rebound, the overall effect on employment was initially 
negligible because of negative contributions to growth from private and public consumption.  
 
                                                 
4 The latent job seeker category comprises also full-time students (including persons in labor market training) that 
search for employment.    8
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Notes: The ILO-definition includes full time students search work; the Swedish definition does not. Broad 
unemployment includes also “latent job searchers”. The unemployment rates are measured relative to the labor 
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16-64. 
Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
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Notes: Nonemployment (left axis) is measured as (1-employment/population). Trend nonemployment is estimated 
by a Hodrick-Prescott filter. The age groups are 16-64. 
Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden.   9
In early 1993, the central bank announced a strategy of inflation targeting. The goal of 
monetary policy should be to stabilize annual consumer price inflation at 2 percent, with a 
margin of tolerance of  1 ±  percentage point. A new amendment to the central bank legislation, 
in force from 1999, gave the central bank greater independence from direct political influence. 
A new executive board consisting of six full-time members was made responsible for monetary 
and exchange rate policies. 
 
By and large, the new framework for monetary policy has been successful in achieving its main 
goal. Inflation has stayed within the tolerable band for most of the time and a credible low 
inflation regime has been established. The average annual rate of consumer price inflation has 
been 1.6 percent over the period 1993-2002, thus undershooting the inflation target. But the 
low inflation regime did not materialize without costs. Available survey-based estimates of 
inflation expectations from around 1995 indicated that the low inflation target was far from 
universally credible. According to some measures, expectations of medium-term inflation 
hovered around 4 percent. These stubborn inflation expectations triggered a series of central 
bank interventions to establish its non-inflationary credentials. The repo rate (the main 
signaling rate) was raised in steps between 1994 and 1995, reaching close to 9 percent in the 
second half of 1995. These policies appeared to be effective as inflation as well as inflation 
expectations fell over the next couple of years and paved the way for a series of repo rate 
reductions during 1996. 
 
Whether the successful conquest of inflation has been good or bad for employment remains an 
open question. The generally restrictive monetary policy of the mid-1990s probably delayed the 
economic upswing although it may have been necessary in order to secure credibility for the 
low inflation target. A more controversial issue is whether the new monetary policy framework 
is employment-friendly or not. There are pros and cons in this matter. On the pros side, it can 
be argued that a more independent central bank strengthens incentives for wage moderation. On 
the cons side, an ambitious price stabilization target may arguably be in conflict with ambitious 
employment goals in the presence of nominal rigidities as emphasized by Akerlof et al (1996, 
2000). 
   10
When the slump hit the economy, the government’s budget deficit rose sharply and by 1992 the 
budget deficit for the consolidated public sector stood at 12 percent of GDP. The government’s 
debt-to-GDP ratio amounted to 76 percent by the end of the year. The need to bring 
government finances under control became a top priority for the new (social democratic) 
government in 1994. The following years involved a major effort to stabilize government debt 
and to reduce the budget deficit. The program entailed expenditure cuts, especially concerning 
transfers, as well as tax increases. The policies were resoundingly successful in terms of the 
stated objectives: by the end of the decade, the government’s budget deficit was eliminated and 
the debt-to-GDP ratio had declined to 60 percent.  
 
The generally contractive fiscal policy is presumably one reason why unemployment remained 
stubbornly high in the mid-1990s. However, the fiscal consolidation added credibility to the 
anti-inflationary stance of macroeconomic policy. Fiscal policies were eased to support growth 
of private and public consumption as the budgetary goals were met and absent any visible 
threat to the low inflation target.  
 
One ingredient of the fiscal consolidation was the introduction in 1996 of a new system for 
decisions on government expenditure. The goal was to establish a long-term approach to 
expenditure decisions. The key innovation involved three-year nominal expenditure ceilings. In 
year 1997, say, decisions should be taken on expenditure for 1998, 1999 and 2000. To some 
degree, this system tied the hands of fiscal policy, although some room was left for 
discretionary policies. This reform was followed by a decision to set a goal for the general 
government budget surplus of 2 percent of GDP as an average over the business cycle.  
 
Summing up, several sources of movements in Swedish unemployment can be identified. 
Monetary policy was extremely contractionary during most of 1992, with the nominal interest 
rate hitting 500 percent at the same time as the real exchange rate was overvalued. Fiscal policy 
was contractionary in the mid-1990s and probably expansionary in the late 1990s. International 
business cycle movements almost certainly have had substantial effects on the small open 
Swedish economy. We will in the remaining part of the paper make use of a small structural   11
VAR model to disentangle how various shocks can account for the Swedish unemployment 
experience. 
 
3. Model Specification 
3.1 The VAR Approach 
Unemployment is conceivably affected by a very large number of factors such as labor supply, 
productivity, foreign demand, fiscal policy, international competitiveness, oil price shocks, etc. 
In order to analyze the effects of monetary policy, these other variables have to be taken into 
account as well. However, a structural VAR model quickly becomes cumbersome as the 
number of included variables increases. The number of parameters to be estimated increases 
with the number of lags times the number of endogenous variables, while the length of 
available time series restricts the possible number of observations. Furthermore, the number of 
theoretically sensible identifying assumptions to separate the different structural shocks also 
increases with n(n-r)/2, where n is the number of endogenous variables and r is the number of 
cointegrating relations (possibly zero). We have to choose a reasonably small set of variables 
that still covers as much as possible of the movements in unemployment that are unrelated to 
monetary policy. Unemployment itself and a measure of monetary policy are self-evident, as is 
foreign demand for a small open economy like Sweden. Any foreign variables can be assumed 
to be exogenous, which facilitates identification and saves degrees of freedom. Based on results 
from the previous studies discussed above, domestic demand, productivity, and fiscal policy are 
also major sources of movements in unemployment. This yields six variables, three of which 
will be modeled as exogenous. 
 
Several different methods of identification are available within the VAR literature. In a seminal 
article by Blanchard and Quah (1989), restrictions are imposed on the long-run effects of 
shocks. For instance, productivity shocks are separated from demand shocks by assuming that 
demand shocks do not affect real output in the long run while productivity shocks do. Alexius 
and Carlsson (2005) show that this long-run restriction works well in the sense that the 
identified technology shocks are highly correlated with refined Solow residuals in Swedish 
data. In Sims (1980) identification is achieved using short-run restrictions on the timing of the 
effects of shocks only. For instance, monetary policy shocks are frequently identified by   12
assuming that a change in the interest rate does not affect inflation in the same period since 
prices are sticky and respond with a delay. We believe that a combination of the two 
approaches yields the most convincing identification in this context. In an n-variable system a 
total of n(n-1)/2 restrictions are needed for exact identification after imposing an identity 
covariance matrix of the structural shocks.  
 
We start with the VMA() form of the reduced form estimation 
 
(1)     () tt x ALe =  
 
where A(L) is the inverted lag polynomial from the reduced form estimation and  t e denotes the 
reduced form residuals. Then, assume that the structural form VMA(∞) can be written as 
 
(2)     () tt x CLε =  
 
where C(L) is the structural counterpart to A(L) above and  t ε  are the structural shocks. 
Equating the two representations of the system in (2) and (3) and manipulating we get 
 
(3)     0 (1) (1) CA C =  
 
where C(1) is the long-run VMA impact matrix of the structural shocks, A(1) the estimated 
VMA(∞) from the reduced form estimation stage and  0 C  the short-run matrix defining the 
reduced form shocks as linear combinations of the structural shocks. This short run impact 
matrix is all we need for further analysis through impulse response functions and forecast error 
variance decompositions since it traces out the effects of structural shocks to the variables. 
 
3.2 Measuring Monetary Policy 
During the first part of the sample Sweden participated in a sequence of fixed exchange rate 
arrangements. In November 1992 the fixed exchange rate was abandoned and Swedish krona 
was instead allowed to float. When the sample period covers both fixed and floating exchange   13
rate regimes, we either have to split the sample and estimate two different models using 
different variables to represent monetary policy, or construct a single time series that captures 
the effects of monetary policy on the economy in both regimes. The largest monetary policy 
shocks during the period occurred in 1992 as the Riksbank increased the interest up to 500 
percentage points in order to defend the overvalued fixed exchange rate. This is a major interest 
rate shock during the fixed exchange rate period that would not be captured by an exchange 
rate variable alone. We solve this dilemma by using a so called monetary conditions index 
(MCI) that captures the total effect on the economy of the exchange rate and the interest rate.
5 
 
An MCI is a weighted average of the real interest rate and the real exchange rate, where the 
weights depend on the relative effects of the two variables on demand. The typical weight is 
around three to one for the interest rate relative to the real exchange rate, implying that one 
percentage point higher (real) interest rate has three times as large effect on aggregate demand 
as a real exchange rate appreciation of one percent. The Riksbank used an MCI for several 
years after the floating of the Krona, with a relative weight of 2.4 to 1 estimated on Swedish 
data. For our sample period, the relative effect of the real interest rate versus the real exchange 
rate on demand has changed over time. This is not surprising given the changes in the 
economic environment that have occurred. Swedish capital markets were deregulated during 
the second part of the 1980s. Market interest rates barely existed and certainly did not 
constitute market clearing prices prior to 1985-87 as credit was allocated using quantity 
regulations rather than market prices. During the recent float, movements in exchange rates 
have instead had relatively small effects on demand, possibly due to the fact that changes in a 
floating exchange rate are perceived as less permanent than devaluations of a fixed exchange 
rate. In the baseline specification we use time-varying weighting parameters estimated using a 
seven-year window and then smoothed. MCIs constructed using constant estimated coefficients 
and standard coefficients (3 to 1) are included in the robustness section. Both the real exchange 
rate and the real interest rate are deviations from a linear trend. 
 
Figures 3a and 3b show the short-term real interest rate and the real effective exchange rate, 
each along with two different measures of monetary policy. Total monetary policy or the  
                                                 
5 This measure has been used by, among others, Bank of Canada, as operational target of policy.    14
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combined effect of the real interest rate and the real exchange rate was much more 
contractionary during and up the 1992 crisis than either variable on its own.  
 
3.3 Included Variables and Identification 
Our baseline specification includes three endogenous and three exogenous variables. The 
domestic output gap, unemployment, and monetary policy are modeled as endogenous. The 
exogenous variables are foreign output gap, productivity shocks, and a measure of the 
structural budget deficit. We tried to include observed fiscal policy in the model but the effects 
of this variable on the output gap and unemployment were consistently estimated with the 
wrong sign, i.e. expansionary fiscal policy decreased the output gap and increases 
unemployment. A possible reason for this counterintuitive result is the strong co-movement of 
the budget deficits and unemployment during the deep recession of the early 1990s; as noted 
above, the consolidated public sector’s budget deficit stood at 12 percent of GDP in 1992 while 
unemployment soared. This should be captured as effects on the budget of unemployment and 
the output gap, but as these effects appear to be non-linear far away from equilibrium, they may 
spill over into the estimated effect of fiscal policy on activity. Indeed we have to include the 
output gap squared to remove cyclical effects from fiscal policy in a separate VAR.
6 
 
Since we cannot separate real output into a demand driven output gap and a productivity driven 
trend within this VAR, productivity shocks are identified in a first step using the Gali (1999) 
two-variable VAR and included as an exogenous variable in the main model. We are hence left 
with three exogenous and three endogenous variables: domestic output gap (y), unemployment 
(u), monetary policy (MCI) foreign output gap (y*), technology (A), and fiscal policy (G): 
 
(4)       x=[y, u, MCI, y*, A, G] 
 
Since the three final variables are exogenous, three restrictions are needed for exact 
identification. Monetary policy shocks are identified by assuming that a change in the interest 
rate does not affect inflation and the output gap in the same period since prices are sticky and 
                                                 
6 This is done using a two-lag, two-variable VAR with the output gap squared as an exogenous variable. Business 
cycles are then removed by subtracting the estimated effects of the output gap from the budget deficit to obtain our 
measure of the structural budget deficit.   16
respond with a delay. There are two additional shocks in the VAR, presumably a domestic 
demand shock and another labor market shock (such as labor supply or wage setting). Given 
the absence of theoretically justified identifying restrictions we refrain from labeling these two 
shocks.  
 
The number of lags in the VAR is determined using information criteria and misspecification 
tests. As VAR models are autoregressive, it is important to include enough lags to remove 
residual autocorrelation. Based on this information we have included two lags in the base-line 
model. There are arguments in favor of three and even four lags but we have settled for the 
more parsimonious specification. The robustness of the main results with respect to the lag 
length is investigated in Section 6. 
 
The level of unemployment is formally non-stationary over the sample period. Given that we 
want to estimate the persistence of shocks rather than assume that the effects are permanent, 
deterministic components are added to the model in a manner that yields a stationary VAR and 
also a stationary unemployment rate. This can be achieved using either a deterministic time 
trend or an intercept dummy variable from 1992. Measures of model fit unanimously favor the 
deterministic trend specification. Again, models with a 1992 dummy variable and also without 
deterministic components are estimated in Section 6.  
 
4. Data 
We focus mainly on the conventional measure of unemployment, i.e., unemployment according 
to the ILO-criteria. As robustness checks, we also consider extended measures of 
unemployment, viz. (i) broad unemployment that includes latent job seekers in addition to the 
ILO-unemployed, and (ii) the nonemployment rate measured as one minus the employment-to-
population rate. The unemployment series are taken from the Swedish labor force surveys and 
seasonally adjusted using Tramo/Seats. 
 
Real GDP is collected from Statistics Sweden and seasonally adjusted using Tramo/Seats. The 
output gap is obtained using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with  10,000 λ = . The effective real 
exchange rate is constructed using TCW-weights and taken from IFS, as is the three months   17
nominal interest rate. The latter is deflated using seasonally adjusted (Tramo/Seats) realized 
inflation calculated as the percentage change of total CPI, also from Statistics Sweden. The 
government deficit is collected from OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. As discussed, we end 
up using an estimated measure of the structural budget deficit. Data on foreign real GDP 
(OECD 16 minus Belgium due to lack of data) are also taken from OECD’s Main Economic 
Indicators and weighted together to a single series using the same TCW weights as for the 
effective real exchange rate. The foreign output gap is then constructed using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter with  10,000 λ = . 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Estimation Results 
Table 1 summarizes the estimation results. It contains the sums of the coefficients on the two 
lags of each variable and a Wald test for their joint significance. The signs are as expected. 
Expansionary monetary policy increases the output gap and decreases unemployment. Higher 
domestic demand shock decreases unemployment and causes contractions of monetary policy. 
Expansionary fiscal policy increases the output gap and decreases unemployment. Foreign 
demand shocks increase the domestic output gap, lower unemployment and causes contractions 
of monetary policy. Technology shocks decrease unemployment and also the output gap. Table 
1 contains the sum of the coefficients on both lags as well as p-values from F-tests for joint 
significance. 
 
5.2 Impulse Response Functions 
Impulse response functions trace out the path of the effects of a structural shock on a variable 
over time using equation (2). We are particularly interested in the effects of monetary policy 
shocks on the unemployment rate, shown in Figure 4a. Quantitatively these results can be 
interpreted as follows. A contractionary monetary policy shock of one unit or a one percentage 
point rise in the real interest rate results in 0.25 percentage points higher unemployment after 9 
quarters. After ten years unemployment is still 0.07 percentage points higher than it would have 
been without the shock. As this is a stationary VAR, all shocks are temporary but monetary 
policy is itself persistent so the shock dies out gradually. It is well known that the 95 percent 
asymptotic confidence intervals shown in the graphs are unnecessarily wide but we have   18
refrained from turning to 67 percent confidence intervals as is often done in the VAR literature. 
 
 
Table 1. VAR estimates. 






































































Portmanteau(12) 46.409  (0.115) 
LM(3) 3.142  (0.370) 
Log Likelihood  644.50 
Notes: The estimation period is 1980:1 to 2005:1. The table contains the sums of the coefficients on the two lags 
of each variable, p-values within parentheses. Wald tests for joint significance of both lags of each variable. LM-
tests for lower order autocorrelation and White’s heteroscedasticity test (not reported) are insignificant. 
 
As in Ravn and Simonelli (2006), the response of unemployment to monetary policy shocks is 
hump shaped. In our baseline model a contractionary monetary policy shock obtains its 
maximum effect on unemployment after 9 quarters, which is a more protracted response than in 
Ravn and Simonelli (2006). Half of the maximum effect has disappeared after 30 quarters and 
28 percent of it still remains after ten years. This can be compared to the results in Ravn and 
Simonelli (2006) where a monetary policy shock reaches its maximum effect on unemployment 
after 5 quarters. Their estimated half live is much shorter, only 8 quarters, and none of the 
effect remains after ten years. In fact, their estimated impulse response returns to zero already 
after four years. Hence monetary policy has more persistent effects on unemployment in 
Sweden than in the U.S. Since also univariate models of unemployment display more    19
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Note: Response to a temporary one percentage point increase in the real interest rate. 95 percent asymptotic 
confidence intervals.  
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Note: Response to a temporary one percentage point increase in the real interest rate. 95 percent asymptotic 
confidence intervals.  
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persistence in Sweden and generally Europe than in the U.S., the reason for the different results 
is probably found in the functioning of the labor markets rather than in factors related to 
monetary policy. 
 
The response of unemployment to monetary policy can also be compared to the response of the 
output gap as shown in Figure 4b. These results are fairly similar to the stylized facts. The 
maximum effect occurs after 5 quarters, compared to 11 quarters for unemployment. Half of 
the maximum effect has disappeared after 11 quarters, while this takes 30 quarters in the case 
of unemployment. The estimated impulse response of the output gap returns to zero after 23 
quarters, while the effect on unemployment still persists also after ten years. 
 
The estimated coefficients behind the impulse response functions can be used to determine how 
much unemployment increased due to the contractionary monetary policy during the 1992 
crisis. The total effect can be calculated by feeding the sequence of structural residuals or 
monetary policy shocks from 1991:4 to 1992:3 into the impulse response functions in (2). The 
effects on unemployment over time are shown in Figure 5. The peak occurs during 1994:4 
when 5.6 percent or slightly more than half of the Swedish unemployment was due to the 
contractionary monetary policy during 1991-1992. If the effects up to 2005:1 are accumulated 
and converted to number of unemployed persons and years, this implies that about 1.6 million 
people (1 630 372) or 35 percent of the labor force was unemployed for one year.  
 
5.3 Variance Decompositions 
Forecast error variance decompositions contain information about how much of the fluctuations 
in a variable that are caused by each of the structural shocks at different horizons. We are 
interested in the share of movements in unemployment that is due to monetary policy shocks 
and, in general, which shocks that have been important sources of movements in Swedish 
unemployment. Table 2 shows that monetary policy shocks account for 22-35 percent of the 
fluctuations in unemployment depending on the horizon. This is slightly more than in Ravn and 
Simonelli (2006), where the corresponding share was below 20 percent.  
   21














































6 quarters  7.16  11.58  22.26  11.09  47.91 
20 quarters  8.55  13.61  35.49  15.90  26.45 
40 quarters  7.56  13.61  34.42  20.69  23.69 
 
 
Composite shocks consisting of domestic demand shocks and labor market shocks such as 
movements in labor supply shocks account for 48 percent of the short-run fluctuations in 
unemployment, while the share falls to 23 percent at longer horizons. Fiscal policy and 
technology shocks have minor effects as they account for 10-20 percent of the fluctuations. Our 
results also attribute a minor role to foreign variables. The share of foreign demand shocks does 
not exceed 9 percent at any horizon, a finding that is robust across different specifications of 
the model. This can be compared to the findings in Lindé (2003), where foreign variables 
appear to be an important source of fluctuations in Swedish real output. Our findings indicate 
that this may not be true in the case of the unemployment rate.    22
6. Robustness 
Given that the model is estimated conditional on a number of specific assumptions, we devote 
considerable attention to investigating the robustness of the results to variations in these 
assumptions. Some issues appear minor but could still have potentially large effects on the 
results, like the number of lags in the VAR and the choice between a deterministic trend and a 
1992 regime shift dummy variable. The measures of monetary policy and unemployment are in 
a sense more fundamental.  
 
Figure 6 contains the impulse response functions of unemployment to monetary policy shocks 
in eight different specifications. First, it is clear that the effects peak later than in previous 
studies, after 8-12 quarters compared to five in Ravn and Simonelli (2006). The magnitude of 
the maximum effect varies between 0.22 and 0.41 percentage points, where the response is 
calculated for a shock of one standard deviation. The standard deviation of the identified 
monetary policy shocks typically corresponds to a real interest rate movement of two to three 
percent.  
 
In absolute numbers, unemployment ten years after a contractionary monetary policy shock of 
one standard deviation would be between 0.025 and 0.17 percentage points higher than it 
otherwise would have been. The highest estimated persistence belongs to the model without 
dummy variable and deterministic trend and the lowest stems from the baseline specification 
where the MCI is constructed using coefficient of three for the real exchange rate against one 
for the real interest rate. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the long-run effects of monetary policy shocks on unemployment. The 
results in focus are the share of monetary policy shocks in the variance decompositions of 
unemployment and a measure of the persistence of the effects of monetary policy shocks on 
unemployment. The share of monetary policy shocks in the ten-year forecast error variance 
decomposition of unemployment varies between 25 and 45 percent. The final column shows 
the share of the maximum effect of monetary policy on unemployment that remains after ten 
years, i.e. the impulse response after 40 quarters divided by the peak effect for each model. 
This is a non-robust result as the share in question varies between 8 and 38 percent.  23

















MCI with standard coefficients
MCI with constant coefficients
4lags
 
Note: The responses are calculated for a shock of one standard deviation.   24
Table 3. Robustness checks. 
Specification FEVD  40 
quarters 
Share remaining after 10 
years 
Extended unemployment  33.67  19.00 
Non-employment 39.12  35.93 
1992 dummy rather than trend  44.93  64.26 
Without trend and without 1992 dummy   43.14  48.75 
4 lags in VAR  38.45  39.44 
Constant coefficients in MCI  27.01  20.59 
Standard coefficients and constant equilibria 
in MCI 
25.79 24.44 
Baseline 34.42  28.10 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Unemployment in Sweden remained low at 2-3 percent throughout the 1970s and the 1980s but 
hit double-digit levels in the early 1990s. It is likely that the rise in unemployment was partly 
driven by a series of adverse macroeconomic shocks, including a contractionary monetary 
policy as the Riksbank stubbornly defended the fixed exchanged rate. Institutional factors may 
also have played some role, although these are somewhat difficult to capture empirically. 
 
Our paper focuses on the effects of monetary policy on Swedish unemployment fluctuations. 
To that end, we estimate a structural VAR model and find that between 22 and 35 percent of 
the fluctuations in unemployment are caused by shocks to monetary policy. The effects are also 
quite persistent. In the preferred model, around 30 percent of the effects of a shock still remain 
after ten years. As the major aspects of the model is varied across reasonable alternatives, the 
share of the maximum effect of a monetary policy shock that remains after ten years ranges 
between about 19 and 65 percent. While this maximum effect occurs already after five quarters 
in the U.S., the hump-shaped responses peak after 7-17 quarters in Sweden depending on the 
exact specification of the VAR. Hence monetary policy appears to have slightly larger and 
much more persistent effects on unemployment in Sweden than in the U.S. It is plausible that 
these differences reflect differences in labor market institutions rather than monetary policy. 
Employment protection legislation, in particular, is much more stringent in Sweden, a fact 
which is bound to increase unemployment persistence.  
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The reaction of unemployment to monetary policy shocks is found to be different from and in 
particular much more persistent than the better documented reaction of the output gap to 
monetary policy shocks. Our estimates of the latter impulse response function are fairly 
consistent with stylized facts. The maximum effect of monetary policy on output occurs after 5 
quarters, which is a standard finding. Half of the effect of the shock has disappeared after three 
years and the point estimate returns to zero after six years. The latter results imply slightly 
more persistence also in the output gap than what is typically observed although not nearly as 
much persistence as we document in case of the response of unemployment to monetary policy 
shocks. Hence it is not correct to view the reaction of unemployment to a shock as simply a 
mapping of the corresponding reaction of the output gap. 
 
Although our study attributes a significant role to monetary policy, a more complete 
explanation of Swedish unemployment requires an understanding of the causes of the trend rise 
that we have taken as exogenous. This remains as an important (although difficult) issue for 
future research. A second interesting remaining question is whether the prolonged effects of 
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